The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

of the statue, and the body has
the disease.-(3) As that which contains holds the things contained;
for a thing is said to be held by that in which it is as in a
container; e.g. we say that the vessel holds the liquid and the
city holds men and the ship sailors; and so too that the whole
holds the parts.-(4) That which hinders a thing from moving or
acting according to its own impulse is said to hold it, as pillars
hold the incumbent weights, and as the poets make Atlas hold the
heavens, implying that otherwise they would collapse on the earth,
as some of the natural philosophers also say. In this way also that
which holds things together is said to hold the things it holds
together, since they would otherwise separate, each according to
its own impulse.
    ‘Being in something’ has similar and corresponding meanings to
‘holding’ or ‘having’.
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    ‘To come from something’ means (1) to come from something as
from matter, and this in two senses, either in respect of the
highest genus or in respect of the lowest species; e.g. in a sense
all things that can be melted come from water, but in a sense the
statue comes from bronze.-(2) As from the first moving principle;
e.g. ‘what did the fight come from?’ From abusive language, because
this was the origin of the fight.-(3) From the compound of matter
and shape, as the parts come from the whole, and the verse from the
Iliad, and the stones from the house; (in every such case the whole
is a compound of matter and shape,) for the shape is the end, and
only that which attains an end is complete.-(4) As the form from
its part, e.g. man from ‘two-footed’and syllable from ‘letter’; for
this is a different sense from that in which the statue comes from
bronze; for the composite substance comes from the sensible matter,
but the form also comes from the matter of the form.-Some things,
then, are said to come from something else in these senses; but (5)
others are so described if one of these senses is applicable to a
part of that other thing; e.g. the child comes from its father and
mother, and plants come from the earth, because they come from a
part of those things.-(6) It means coming after a thing in time,
e.g. night comes from day and storm from fine weather, because the
one comes after the other. Of these things some are so described
because they admit of change into one another, as in the cases now
mentioned; some merely because they are successive in time, e.g.
the voyage took place ‘from’ the equinox, because it took place
after the equinox, and the festival of the Thargelia comes ‘from’
the Dionysia, because after the Dionysia.
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    ‘Part’ means (1) (a) that into which a quantum can in any way be
divided; for that which is taken from a quantum qua quantum is
always called a part of it, e.g. two is called in a sense a part of
three. It means (b), of the parts in the first sense, only those
which measure the whole; this is why two, though in one sense it
is, in another is not, called a part of three.-(2) The elements
into which a kind might be divided apart from the quantity are also
called parts of it; for which reason we say the species are parts
of the genus.-(3) The elements into which a whole is divided, or of
which it consists-the ‘whole’ meaning either the form or that which
has the form; e.g. of the bronze sphere or of the bronze cube both
the bronze-i.e. the matter in which the form is-and the
characteristic angle are parts.-(4) The elements in the definition
which explains a thing are also parts of the whole; this is why the
genus is called a part of the species, though in another sense the
species is part of the genus.
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    ‘A whole’ means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts
of which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so
contains the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in
two senses-either as being each severally one single thing, or as
making up the unity between them. For (a) that which is true of a
whole class and is said to hold good as a whole (which implies that
it is a kind whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it
contains many things by being predicated of each, and by all of
them, e.g. man, horse, god, being severally one single thing,
because all are living things. But (b) the continuous and limited
is a whole,