The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of
itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in
which life directly resides, is a part of the man.-(4) That which
has no cause other than itself; man has more than one cause—animal,
two-footed—but yet man is man in virtue of himself.-(5) Whatever
attributes belong to a thing alone, and in so far as they belong to
it merely by virtue of itself considered apart by itself.
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    ‘Disposition’ means the arrangement of that which has parts, in
respect either of place or of potency or of kind; for there must be
a certain position, as even the word ‘disposition’ shows.
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    ‘Having’ means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and of what
he has-something like an action or movement. For when one thing
makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so too
between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is
a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have; for
the process will go on to infinity, if it is to be possible to have
the having of what we have.-(2) ‘Having’ or ‘habit’ means a
disposition according to which that which is disposed is either
well or ill disposed, and either in itself or with reference to
something else; e.g. health is a ‘habit’; for it is such a
disposition.-(3) We speak of a ‘habit’ if there is a portion of
such a disposition; and so even the excellence of the parts is a
‘habit’ of the whole thing.
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    ‘Affection’ means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can
be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and
lightness, and all others of the kind.-(2) The actualization of
these-the already accomplished alterations.-(3) Especially,
injurious alterations and movements, and, above all painful
injuries.-(4) Misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large
scale are called affections.
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    We speak of ‘privation’ (1) if something has not one of the
attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing
itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is said to be
‘deprived’ of eyes.-(2) If, though either the thing itself or its
genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not; e.g. a
blind man and a mole are in different senses ‘deprived’ of sight;
the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with
his own normal nature.-(3) If, though it would naturally have the
attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for
blindness is a privation, but one is not ‘blind’ at any and every
age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would
naturally have it. Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not
sight in the medium in which, and in respect of the organ in
respect of which, and with reference to the object with reference
to which, and in the circumstances in which, it would naturally
have it.-(4) The violent taking away of anything is called
privation.
    Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as there are
of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal
because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and
invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has
a poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or
because it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used
because the thing has little of the attribute (and this means
having it in a sense imperfectly), e.g. ‘kernel-less’; or because
it has it not easily or not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable
not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or
well); or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not
the one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is
called blind. This is why not every man is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘just’
or ‘unjust’, but there is also an intermediate state.
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    To ‘have’ or ‘hold’ means many things:-(1) to treat a thing
according to one’s own nature or according to one’s own impulse; so
that fever is said to have a man, and tyrants to have their cities,
and people to have the clothes they wear.-(2) That in which a thing
is present as in something receptive of it is said to have the
thing; e.g. the bronze has the form