The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

relative by
accident; e.g. a man is relative because he happens to be double of
something and double is a relative term; or the white is relative,
if the same thing happens to be double and white.
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    What is called ‘complete’ is (1) that outside which it is not
possible to find any, even one, of its parts; e.g. the complete
time of each thing is that outside which it is not possible to find
any time which is a part proper to it.-(2) That which in respect of
excellence and goodness cannot be excelled in its kind; e.g. we
have a complete doctor or a complete flute-player, when they lack
nothing in respect of the form of their proper excellence. And
thus, transferring the word to bad things, we speak of a complete
scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed we even call them good,
i.e. a good thief and a good scandal-monger. And excellence is a
completion; for each thing is complete and every substance is
complete, when in respect of the form of its proper excellence it
lacks no part of its natural magnitude.-(3) The things which have
attained their end, this being good, are called complete; for
things are complete in virtue of having attained their end.
Therefore, since the end is something ultimate, we transfer the
word to bad things and say a thing has been completely spoilt, and
completely destroyed, when it in no wise falls short of destruction
and badness, but is at its last point. This is why death, too, is
by a figure of speech called the end, because both are last things.
But the ultimate purpose is also an end.-Things, then, that are
called complete in virtue of their own nature are so called in all
these senses, some because in respect of goodness they lack nothing
and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found
outside them, others in general because they cannot be exceeded in
their several classes and no part proper to them is outside them;
the others presuppose these first two kinds, and are called
complete because they either make or have something of the sort or
are adapted to it or in some way or other involve a reference to
the things that are called complete in the primary sense.
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    ‘Limit’ means (1) the last point of each thing, i.e. the first
point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, and the
first point within which every part is; (2) the form, whatever it
may be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude;
(3) the end of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which
the movement and the action are, not that from which they
are-though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which
the movement is, i.e. the final cause); (4) the substance of each
thing, and the essence of each; for this is the limit of knowledge;
and if of knowledge, of the object also. Evidently, therefore,
‘limit’ has as many senses as ‘beginning’, and yet more; for the
beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning.
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    ‘That in virtue of which’ has several meanings:-(1) the form or
substance of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of which a man is good
is the good itself, (2) the proximate subject in which it is the
nature of an attribute to be found, e.g. colour in a surface. ‘That
in virtue of which’, then, in the primary sense is the form, and in
a secondary sense the matter of each thing and the proximate
substratum of each.-In general ‘that in virtue of which’ will found
in the same number of senses as ‘cause’; for we say indifferently
(3) in virtue of what has he come?’ or ‘for what end has he come?’;
and (4) in virtue of what has he inferred wrongly, or inferred?’ or
‘what is the cause of the inference, or of the wrong
inference?’-Further (5) Kath’ d is used in reference to position,
e.g. ‘at which he stands’ or ‘along which he walks; for all such
phrases indicate place and position.
    Therefore ‘in virtue of itself’ must likewise have several
meanings. The following belong to a thing in virtue of itself:-(1)
the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself
Callias and what it was to be Callias;-(2) whatever is present in
the ‘what’, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For
‘animal’ is present in his definition; Callias is a particular
animal.-(3) Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly
or in one of its