The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

when it is a unity consisting of several parts,
especially if they are present only potentially, but, failing this,
even if they are present actually. Of these things themselves,
those which are so by nature are wholes in a higher degree than
those which are so by art, as we said in the case of unity also,
wholeness being in fact a sort of oneness.
    Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning and a middle and an
end, those to which the position does not make a difference are
called totals, and those to which it does, wholes. Those which
admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These are
the things whose nature remains the same after transposition, but
whose form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; they are called both
wholes and totals; for they have both characteristics. Water and
all liquids and number are called totals, but ‘the whole number’ or
‘the whole water’ one does not speak of, except by an extension of
meaning. To things, to which qua one the term ‘total’ is applied,
the term ‘all’ is applied when they are treated as separate; ‘this
total number,’ ‘all these units.’
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27
    It is not any chance quantitative thing that can be said to be
‘mutilated’; it must be a whole as well as divisible. For not only
is two not ‘mutilated’ if one of the two ones is taken away (for
the part removed by mutilation is never equal to the remainder),
but in general no number is thus mutilated; for it is also
necessary that the essence remain; if a cup is mutilated, it must
still be a cup; but the number is no longer the same. Further, even
if things consist of unlike parts, not even these things can all be
said to be mutilated, for in a sense a number has unlike parts
(e.g. two and three) as well as like; but in general of the things
to which their position makes no difference, e.g. water or fire,
none can be mutilated; to be mutilated, things must be such as in
virtue of their essence have a certain position. Again, they must
be continuous; for a musical scale consists of unlike parts and has
position, but cannot become mutilated. Besides, not even the things
that are wholes are mutilated by the privation of any part. For the
parts removed must be neither those which determine the essence nor
any chance parts, irrespective of their position; e.g. a cup is not
mutilated if it is bored through, but only if the handle or a
projecting part is removed, and a man is mutilated not if the flesh
or the spleen is removed, but if an extremity is, and that not
every extremity but one which when completely removed cannot grow
again. Therefore baldness is not a mutilation.
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28
    The term ‘race’ or ‘genus’ is used (1) if generation of things
which have the same form is continuous, e.g. ‘while the race of men
lasts’ means ‘while the generation of them goes on
continuously’.-(2) It is used with reference to that which first
brought things into existence; for it is thus that some are called
Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former proceed
from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter. And
the word is used in reference to the begetter more than to the
matter, though people also get a race-name from the female, e.g.
‘the descendants of Pyrrha’.-(3) There is genus in the sense in
which ‘plane’ is the genus of plane figures and solid’ of solids;
for each of the figures is in the one case a plane of such and such
a kind, and in the other a solid of such and such a kind; and this
is what underlies the differentiae. Again (4) in definitions the
first constituent element, which is included in the ‘what’, is the
genus, whose differentiae the qualities are said to be ‘Genus’ then
is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous
generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover
which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter;
for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the
substratum, which we call matter.
    Those things are said to be ‘other in genus’ whose proximate
substratum is different, and which are not analysed the one into
the other nor both into the same thing (e.g. form and matter are
different in genus); and things which belong to different
categories of being (for some of the things that are said to ‘be’
signify essence, others a quality, others the other categories we
have before