The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

happiness is
they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise.
For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like
pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one
another—and often even the same man identifies it with different
things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor;
but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim
some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some
thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is
self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To
examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat
fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that
seem to be arguable.
    Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference
between arguments from and those to the first principles. For
Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he
used to do, ‘are we on the way from or to the first principles?’
There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the
course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For,
while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of
knowledge in two sensessome to us, some without qualification.
Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence any
one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble
and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science
must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the
starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will
not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been
well brought up has or can easily get startingpoints. And as for
him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of
Hesiod:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.
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5
    Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which
we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and
men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to
identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason
why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say,
three prominent types of life—that just mentioned, the political,
and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are
evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable
to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact
that many of those in high places share the tastes of
Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows
that people of superior refinement and of active disposition
identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the
end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what
we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who
bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we
divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from
him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be
assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical
wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know
them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according
to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even
suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political
life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of
virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with
lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and
misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy,
unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of
this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the
current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we
shall consider later.
    The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and
wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely
useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather
take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for
themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet
many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us
leave this subject, then.
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6
    We had perhaps better consider the universal good and