The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

live so, but in so far as something
divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our
composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the
exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in
comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in
comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise
us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of
mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal,
and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in
us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and
worth surpass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man
himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It
would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his
self but that of something else. And what we said before’ will
apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and
most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life
according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than
anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest.
<
    div class="section" title="8">
8
    But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other
kind of virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this
befit our human estate. Just and brave acts, and other virtuous
acts, we do in relation to each other, observing our respective
duties with regard to contracts and services and all manner of
actions and with regard to passions; and all of these seem to be
typically human. Some of them seem even to arise from the body, and
virtue of character to be in many ways bound up with the passions.
Practical wisdom, too, is linked to virtue of character, and this
to practical wisdom, since the principles of practical wisdom are
in accordance with the moral virtues and rightness in morals is in
accordance with practical wisdom. Being connected with the passions
also, the moral virtues must belong to our composite nature; and
the virtues of our composite nature are human; so, therefore, are
the life and the happiness which correspond to these. The
excellence of the reason is a thing apart; we must be content to
say this much about it, for to describe it precisely is a task
greater than our purpose requires. It would seem, however, also to
need external equipment but little, or less than moral virtue does.
Grant that both need the necessaries, and do so equally, even if
the statesman’s work is the more concerned with the body and things
of that sort; for there will be little difference there; but in
what they need for the exercise of their activities there will be
much difference. The liberal man will need money for the doing of
his liberal deeds, and the just man too will need it for the
returning of services (for wishes are hard to discern, and even
people who are not just pretend to wish to act justly); and the
brave man will need power if he is to accomplish any of the acts
that correspond to his virtue, and the temperate man will need
opportunity; for how else is either he or any of the others to be
recognized? It is debated, too, whether the will or the deed is
more essential to virtue, which is assumed to involve both; it is
surely clear that its perfection involves both; but for deeds many
things are needed, and more, the greater and nobler the deeds are.
But the man who is contemplating the truth needs no such thing, at
least with a view to the exercise of his activity; indeed they are,
one may say, even hindrances, at all events to his contemplation;
but in so far as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he
chooses to do virtuous acts; he will therefore need such aids to
living a human life.
    But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will
appear from the following consideration as well. We assume the gods
to be above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of
actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods
seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on?
Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers and running risks
because it is noble to do so? Or liberal acts? To whom will they
give? It will be strange if they are really to have money or
anything of the kind. And what would their temperate acts be? Is
not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad appetites? If we
were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be
found trivial and