The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life
requires exertion, and does not consist in amusement. And we say
that serious things are better than laughable things and those
connected with amusement, and that the activity of the better of
any two things-whether it be two elements of our being or two
men-is the more serious; but the activity of the better is ipso
facto superior and more of the nature of happiness. And any chance
person-even a slave-can enjoy the bodily pleasures no less than the
best man; but no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness-unless
he assigns to him also a share in human life. For happiness does
not lie in such occupations, but, as we have said before, in
virtuous activities.
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7
    If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is
reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue;
and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason
or something else that is this element which is thought to be our
natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and
divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine
element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper
virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is
contemplative we have already said.
    Now this would seem to be in agreement both with what we said
before and with the truth. For, firstly, this activity is the best
(since not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of
reason are the best of knowable objects); and secondly, it is the
most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously
than we can do anything. And we think happiness has pleasure
mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is
admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities; at all events
the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvellous for
their purity and their enduringness, and it is to be expected that
those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who
inquire. And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong
most to the contemplative activity. For while a philosopher, as
well as a just man or one possessing any other virtue, needs the
necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with
things of that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with
whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and
each of the others is in the same case, but the philosopher, even
when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he
is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still
he is the most self-sufficient. And this activity alone would seem
to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from
the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or
less apart from the action. And happiness is thought to depend on
leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war
that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical
virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the
actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike
actions are completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, or
provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem
absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in
order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the
statesman is also unleisurely, and-apart from the political action
itself-aims at despotic power and honours, or at all events
happiness, for him and his fellow citizens-a happiness different
from political action, and evidently sought as being different. So
if among virtuous actions political and military actions are
distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely
and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, but the
activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be
superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and
to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the
activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness
(so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes
ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected
with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete
happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for
none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).
    But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so
far as he is man that he will