The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

unworthy of gods. Still, every one supposes that
they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose
them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living
being action, and still more production, what is left but
contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all
others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human
activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most
of the nature of happiness.
    This is indicated, too, by the fact that the other animals have
no share in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity.
For while the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of men
too in so far as some likeness of such activity belongs to them,
none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in
contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as
contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully
belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant but in
virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself precious.
Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation.
    But, being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for
our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation,
but our body also must be healthy and must have food and other
attention. Still, we must not think that the man who is to be happy
will need many things or great things, merely because he cannot be
supremely happy without external goods; for self-sufficiency and
action do not involve excess, and we can do noble acts without
ruling earth and sea; for even with moderate advantages one can act
virtuously (this is manifest enough; for private persons are
thought to do worthy acts no less than despots-indeed even more);
and it is enough that we should have so much as that; for the life
of the man who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy.
Solon, too, was perhaps sketching well the happy man when he
described him as moderately furnished with externals but as having
done (as Solon thought) the noblest acts, and lived temperately;
for one can with but moderate possessions do what one ought.
Anaxagoras also seems to have supposed the happy man not to be rich
nor a despot, when he said that he would not be surprised if the
happy man were to seem to most people a strange person; for they
judge by externals, since these are all they perceive. The opinions
of the wise seem, then, to harmonize with our arguments. But while
even such things carry some conviction, the truth in practical
matters is discerned from the facts of life; for these are the
decisive factor. We must therefore survey what we have already
said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it
harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with
them we must suppose it to be mere theory. Now he who exercises his
reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state of mind
and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human
affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both
that they should delight in that which was best and most akin to
them (i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love and
honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them
and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes
belong most of all to the philosopher is manifest. He, therefore,
is the dearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably be
also the happiest; so that in this way too the philosopher will
more than any other be happy.
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9
    If these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and
pleasure, have been dealt with sufficiently in outline, are we to
suppose that our programme has reached its end? Surely, as the
saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is not to
survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them;
with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must
try to have and use it, or try any other way there may be of
becoming good. Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make
men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great
rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things
are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the
generous-minded among our youth, and to make a character which is
gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be
possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to
nobility and goodness. For these