The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

from one another, constitutions
differ. There is (1) one element which deliberates about public
affairs; secondly (2) that concerned with the magistrates—the
question being, what they should be, over what they should exercise
authority, and what should be the mode of electing to them; and
thirdly (3) that which has judicial power.
    The deliberative element has authority in matters of war and
peace, in making and unmaking alliances; it passes laws, inflicts
death, exile, confiscation, elects magistrates and audits their
accounts. These powers must be assigned either all to all the
citizens or an to some of them (for example, to one or more
magistracies, or different causes to different magistracies), or
some of them to all, and others of them only to some. That all
things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy;
this is the sort of equality which the people desire. But there are
various ways in which all may share in the government; they may
deliberate, not all in one body, but by turns, as in the
constitution of Telecles the Milesian. There are other
constitutions in which the boards of magistrates meet and
deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are elected out of
the tribes and the very smallest divisions of the state, until
every one has obtained office in his turn. The citizens, on the
other hand, are assembled only for the purposes of legislation, and
to consult about the constitution, and to hear the edicts of the
magistrates. In another variety of democracy the citizen form one
assembly, but meet only to elect magistrates, to pass laws, to
advise about war and peace, and to make scrutinies. Other matters
are referred severally to special magistrates, who are elected by
vote or by lot out of all the citizens Or again, the citizens meet
about election to offices and about scrutinies, and deliberate
concerning war or alliances while other matters are administered by
the magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by vote. I
am speaking of those magistracies in which special knowledge is
required. A fourth form of democracy is when all the citizens meet
to deliberate about everything, and the magistrates decide nothing,
but only make the preliminary inquiries; and that is the way in
which the last and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we
maintain, to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is at
present administered. All these modes are democratical.
    On the other hand, that some should deliberate about all is
oligarchical. This again is a mode which, like the democratical has
many forms. When the deliberative class being elected out of those
who have a moderate qualification are numerous and they respect and
obey the prohibitions of the law without altering it, and any one
who has the required qualification shares in the government, then,
just because of this moderation, the oligarchy inclines towards
polity. But when only selected individuals and not the whole people
share in the deliberations of the state, then, although, as in the
former case, they observe the law, the government is a pure
oligarchy. Or, again, when those who have the power of deliberation
are self-elected, and son succeeds father, and they and not the
laws are supreme—the government is of necessity oligarchical.
Where, again, particular persons have authority in particular
matters—for example, when the whole people decide about peace and
war and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate everything
else, and they are elected by vote—there the government is an
aristocracy. And if some questions are decided by magistrates
elected by vote, and others by magistrates elected by lot, either
absolutely or out of select candidates, or elected partly by vote,
partly by lot—these practices are partly characteristic of an
aristocratical government, and party of a pure constitutional
government.
    These are the various forms of the deliberative body; they
correspond to the various forms of government. And the government
of each state is administered according to one or other of the
principles which have been laid down. Now it is for the interest of
democracy, according to the most prevalent notion of it (I am
speaking of that extreme form of democracy in which the people are
supreme even over the laws), with a view to better deliberation to
adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts of law. For in
oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges are compelled to
attend under pain of a fine,