The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

use of arms; (5) gymnastic exercises.
(1) The assemblies are thrown open to all, but either the rich only
are fined for non-attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted
upon them. (2) to the magistracies, those who are qualified by
property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may. (3) In
the law courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do
not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, as in the laws
of Charondas, a larger fine is inflicted on the rich, and a smaller
one on the poor. In some states all citizen who have registered
themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes;
but if after registration they do not attend either in the assembly
or at the courts, heavy fines are imposed upon them. The intention
is that through fear of the fines they may avoid registering
themselves, and then they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the
assembly. concerning (4) the possession of arms, and (5) gymnastic
exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit. For the poor are not
obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having them;
and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor for
non-attendance at the gymnasium, and consequently, having nothing
to fear, they do not attend, whereas the rich are liable to a fine,
and therefore they take care to attend.
    These are the devices of oligarchical legislators, and in
democracies they have counter devices. They pay the poor for
attending the assemblies and the law-courts, and they inflict no
penalty on the rich for non-attendance. It is obvious that he who
would duly mix the two principles should combine the practice of
both, and provide that the poor should be paid to attend, and the
rich fined if they do not attend, for then all will take part; if
there is no such combination, power will be in the hands of one
party only. The government should be confined to those who carry
arms. As to the property qualification, no absolute rule can be
laid down, but we must see what is the highest qualification
sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the number of those who
have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those excluded.
Even if they have no share in office, the poor, provided only that
they are not outraged or deprived of their property, will be quiet
enough.
    But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy
thing, since a ruling class is not always humane. And in time of
war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed; when fed,
they are willing enough to fight. In some states the government is
vested, not only in those who are actually serving, but also in
those who have served; among the Malians, for example, the
governing body consisted of the latter, while the magistrates were
chosen from those actually on service. And the earliest government
which existed among the Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly
power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken
from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time
depended on cavalry; indeed, without discipline, infantry are
useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or
tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in their
cavalry). But when cities increased and the heavy armed grew in
strength, more had a share in the government; and this is the
reason why the states which we call constitutional governments have
been hitherto called democracies. Ancient constitutions, as might
be expected, were oligarchical and royal; their population being
small they had no considerable middle class; the people were weak
in numbers and organization, and were therefore more contented to
be governed.
    I have explained why there are various forms of government, and
why there are more than is generally supposed; for democracy, as
well as other constitutions, has more than one form: also what
their differences are, and whence they arise, and what is the best
form of government, speaking generally and to whom the various
forms of government are best suited; all this has now been
explained.
XIV
    Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion, we will
proceed to speak of the points which follow next in order. We will
consider the subject not only in general but with reference to
particular constitutions. All constitutions have three elements,
concerning which the good lawgiver has to regard what is expedient
for each constitution. When they are well-ordered, the constitution
is well-ordered, and as they differ