The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

then, as a refutation depending on
accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is, clearly so
also does a refutation depending on the consequent. We shall have
further to examine this in another way as well.
    Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions
into one consist in our failure to dissect the definition of
‘proposition’. For a proposition is a single statement about a
single thing. For the same definition applies to ‘one single thing
only’ and to the ‘thing’, simply, e.g. to ‘man’ and to ‘one single
man only’ and likewise also in other cases. If, then, a ‘single
proposition’ be one which claims a single thing of a single thing,
a ‘proposition’, simply, will also be the putting of a question of
that kind. Now since a proof starts from propositions and
refutation is a proof, refutation, too, will start from
propositions. If, then, a proposition is a single statement about a
single thing, it is obvious that this fallacy too consists in
ignorance of what a refutation is: for in it what is not a
proposition appears to be one. If, then, the answerer has returned
an answer as though to a single question, there will be a
refutation; while if he has returned one not really but apparently,
there will be an apparent refutation of his thesis. All the types
of fallacy, then, fall under ignorance of what a refutation is,
some of them because the contradiction, which is the distinctive
mark of a refutation, is merely apparent, and the rest failing to
conform to the definition of a proof.
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7
    The deception comes about in the case of arguments that depend
on ambiguity of words and of phrases because we are unable to
divide the ambiguous term (for some terms it is not easy to divide,
e.g. ‘unity’, ‘being’, and ‘sameness’), while in those that depend
on combination and division, it is because we suppose that it makes
no difference whether the phrase be combined or divided, as is
indeed the case with most phrases. Likewise also with those that
depend on accent: for the lowering or raising of the voice upon a
phrase is thought not to alter its meaning-with any phrase, or not
with many. With those that depend on the of expression it is
because of the likeness of expression. For it is hard to
distinguish what kind of things are signified by the same and what
by different kinds of expression: for a man who can do this is
practically next door to the understanding of the truth. A special
reason why a man is liable to be hurried into assent to the fallacy
is that we suppose every predicate of everything to be an
individual thing, and we understand it as being one with the thing:
and we therefore treat it as a substance: for it is to that which
is one with a thing or substance, as also to substance itself, that
‘individually’ and ‘being’ are deemed to belong in the fullest
sense. For this reason, too, this type of fallacy is to be ranked
among those that depend on language; in the first place, because
the deception is effected the more readily when we are inquiring
into a problem in company with others than when we do so by
ourselves (for an inquiry with another person is carried on by
means of speech, whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried on quite
as much by means of the object itself); secondly a man is liable to
be deceived, even when inquiring by himself, when he takes speech
as the basis of his inquiry: moreover the deception arises out of
the likeness (of two different things), and the likeness arises out
of the language. With those fallacies that depend upon Accident,
deception comes about because we cannot distinguish the sameness
and otherness of terms, i.e. their unity and multiplicity, or what
kinds of predicate have all the same accidents as their subject.
Likewise also with those that depend on the Consequent: for the
consequent is a branch of Accident. Moreover, in many cases
appearances point to this-and the claim is made that if is
inseparable from B, so also is B from With those that depend upon
an imperfection in the definition of a refutation, and with those
that depend upon the difference between a qualified and an absolute
statement, the deception consists in the smallness of the
difference involved; for we treat the limitation to the particular
thing or respect or manner or time as adding nothing to the
meaning, and so grant the statement universally. Likewise also in
the case of those that