The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

negation; but for all that,
suppose any one were to say, ‘This is not white’, he does not say
that it is white. The bare word ‘double’, one may perhaps say, has
not even any meaning at all, any more than has ‘the’ in ‘the half’:
and even if it has a meaning, yet it has not the same meaning as in
the combination. Nor is ‘knowledge’ the same thing in a specific
branch of it (suppose it, e.g. to be ‘medical knowledge’) as it is
in general: for in general it was the ‘knowledge of the knowable’.
In the case of terms that are predicated of the terms through which
they are defined, you should say the same thing, that the term
defined is not the same in abstraction as it is in the whole
phrase. For ‘concave’ has a general meaning which is the same in
the case of a snub nose, and of a bandy leg, but when added to
either substantive nothing prevents it from differentiating its
meaning; in fact it bears one sense as applied to the nose, and
another as applied to the leg: for in the former connexion it means
‘snub’ and in the latter ‘bandyshaped’; i.e. it makes no difference
whether you say ‘a snub nose’ or ‘a concave nose’. Moreover, the
expression must not be granted in the nominative case: for it is a
falsehood. For snubness is not a concave nose but something (e.g.
an affection) belonging to a nose: hence, there is no absurdity in
supposing that the snub nose is a nose possessing the concavity
that belongs to a nose.
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32
    With regard to solecisms, we have previously said what it is
that appears to bring them about; the method of their solution will
be clear in the course of the arguments themselves. Solecism is the
result aimed at in all arguments of the following kind: ‘Is a thing
truly that which you truly call it?’ ‘Yes’. ‘But, speaking of a
stone, you call him real: therefore of a stone it follows that “him
is real”.’ No: rather, talking of a stone means not saying which’
but ‘whom’, and not ‘that’ but ‘him’. If, then, any one were to
ask, ‘Is a stone him whom you truly call him?’ he would be
generally thought not to be speaking good Greek, any more than if
he were to ask, ‘Is he what you call her?’ Speak in this way of a
‘stick’ or any neuter word, and the difference does not break out.
For this reason, also, no solecism is incurred, suppose any one
asks, ‘Is a thing what you say it to be?’ ‘Yes’. ‘But, speaking of
a stick, you call it real: therefore, of a stick it follows that it
is real.’ ‘Stone’, however, and ‘he’ have masculine designations.
Now suppose some one were to ask, ‘Can “he” be a she” (a female)?’,
and then again, ‘Well, but is not he Coriscus?’ and then were to
say, ‘Then he is a “she”,’ he has not proved the solecism, even if
the name ‘Coriscus’ does signify a ‘she’, if, on the other hand,
the answerer does not grant this: this point must be put as an
additional question: while if neither is it the fact nor does he
grant it, then the sophist has not proved his case either in fact
or as against the person he has been questioning. In like manner,
then, in the above instance as well it must be definitely put that
‘he’ means the stone. If, however, this neither is so nor is
granted, the conclusion must not be stated: though it follows
apparently, because the case (the accusative), that is really
unlike, appears to be like the nominative. ‘Is it true to say that
this object is what you call it by name?’ ‘Yes’. ‘But you call it
by the name of a shield: this object therefore is “of a shield”.’
No: not necessarily, because the meaning of ‘this object’ is not
‘of a shield’ but ‘a shield’: ‘of a shield’ would be the meaning of
‘this object’s’. Nor again if ‘He is what you call him by name’,
while ‘the name you call him by is Cleon’s’, is he therefore
‘Cleon’s’: for he is not ‘Cleon’s’, for what was said was that ‘He,
not his, is what I call him by name’. For the question, if put in
the latter way, would not even be Greek. ‘Do you know this?’ ‘Yes.’
‘But this is he: therefore you know he’. No: rather ‘this’ has not
the same meaning in ‘Do you know this?’ as in ‘This is a stone’; in
the first it stands for an accusative, in the second for a
nominative case. ‘When you have understanding of anything, do you
understand it?’ ‘Yes.’