The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

speaks of A as being ‘B’s child’ in the literal sense, if B is
the child’s master, but the combination depends upon Accident. ‘Is
A yours?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And is A a child?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then the child A is
yours,’ because he happens to be both yours and a child; but he is
not ‘your child’.
    There is also the proof that ‘something “of evils” is good’; for
wisdom is a ‘knowledge “of evils”’. But the expression that this is
‘of so and-so’ (=’so-and-so’s’) has not a number of meanings: it
means that it is ‘so-and-so’s property’. We may suppose of course,
on the other hand, that it has a number of meanings-for we also say
that man is ‘of the animals’, though not their property; and also
that any term related to ‘evils’ in a way expressed by a genitive
case is on that account a so-and-so ‘of evils’, though it is not
one of the evils-but in that case the apparently different meanings
seem to depend on whether the term is used relatively or
absolutely. ‘Yet it is conceivably possible to find a real
ambiguity in the phrase “Something of evils is good”.’ Perhaps, but
not with regard to the phrase in question. It would occur more
nearly, suppose that ‘A servant is good of the wicked’; though
perhaps it is not quite found even there: for a thing may be ‘good’
and be ‘X’s’ without being at the same time ‘X’s good’. Nor is the
saying that ‘Man is of the animals’ a phrase with a number of
meanings: for a phrase does not become possessed of a number of
meanings merely suppose we express it elliptically: for we express
‘Give me the Iliad’ by quoting half a line of it, e.g. ‘Give me
“Sing, goddess, of the wrath… ”’
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25
    Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of
a particular thing, or in a particular respect, or place, or
manner, or relation, and not valid absolutely, should be solved by
considering the conclusion in relation to its contradictory, to see
if any of these things can possibly have happened to it. For it is
impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a
negative to belong to the same thing absolutely; there is, however,
nothing to prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or
relation or manner, or to prevent one of them from belonging in a
particular respect and the other absolutely. So that if this one
belongs absolutely and that one in a particular respect, there is
as yet no refutation. This is a feature one has to find in the
conclusion by examining it in comparison with its
contradictory.
    All arguments of the following kind have this feature: ‘Is it
possible for what is-not to be? “No.” But, you see, it is
something, despite its not being.’ Likewise also, Being will not
be; for it will not he some particular form of being. Is it
possible for the same man at the same time to be a keeper and a
breaker of his oath?’ ‘Can the same man at the same time both obey
and disobey the same man?’ Or isn’t it the case that being
something in particular and Being are not the same? On the other
hand, Not-being, even if it be something, need not also have
absolute ‘being’ as well. Nor if a man keeps his oath in this
particular instance or in this particular respect, is he bound also
to be a keeper of oaths absolutely, but he who swears that he will
break his oath, and then breaks it, keeps this particular oath
only; he is not a keeper of his oath: nor is the disobedient man
‘obedient’, though he obeys one particular command. The argument is
similar, also, as regards the problem whether the same man can at
the same time say what is both false and true: but it appears to be
a troublesome question because it is not easy to see in which of
the two connexions the word ‘absolutely’ is to be rendered-with
‘true’ or with ‘false’. There is, however, nothing to prevent it
from being false absolutely, though true in some particular respect
or relation, i.e. being true in some things, though not ‘true’
absolutely. Likewise also in cases of some particular relation and
place and time. For all arguments of the following kind depend upon
this.’ Is health, or wealth, a good thing?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But to the fool
who does not use it aright it is not a good thing: therefore it is
both good and not good.’ ‘Is health, or political power, a good
thing?’ ‘Yes. “But sometimes it is not