The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

particularly good: therefore
the same thing is both good and not good to the same man.’ Or
rather there is nothing to prevent a thing, though good absolutely,
being not good to a particular man, or being good to a particular
man, and yet not good or here. ‘Is that which the prudent man would
not wish, an evil?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But to get rid of, he would not wish
the good: therefore the good is an evil.’ But that is a mistake;
for it is not the same thing to say ‘The good is an evil’ and ‘to
get rid of the good is an evil’. Likewise also the argument of the
thief is mistaken. For it is not the case that if the thief is an
evil thing, acquiring things is also evil: what he wishes,
therefore, is not what is evil but what is good; for to acquire
something good is good. Also, disease is an evil thing, but not to
get rid of disease. ‘Is the just preferable to the unjust, and what
takes place justly to what takes place unjustly? ‘Yes.’ ‘But to to
be put to death unjustly is preferable.’ ‘Is it just that each
should have his own?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But whatever decisions a man comes to
on the strength of his personal opinion, even if it be a false
opinion, are valid in law: therefore the same result is both just
and unjust.’ Also, should one decide in favour of him who says what
is unjust?’ ‘The former.’ ‘But you see, it is just for the injured
party to say fully the things he has suffered; and these are
fallacies. For because to suffer a thing unjustly is preferable,
unjust ways are not therefore preferable, though in this particular
case the unjust may very well be better than the just. Also, to
have one’s own is just, while to have what is another’s is not
just: all the same, the decision in question may very well be a
just decision, whatever it be that the opinion of the man who gave
the decision supports: for because it is just in this particular
case or in this particular manner, it is not also just absolutely.
Likewise also, though things are unjust, there is nothing to
prevent the speaking of them being just: for because to speak of
things is just, there is no necessity that the things should be
just, any more than because to speak of things be of use, the
things need be of use. Likewise also in the case of what is just.
So that it is not the case that because the things spoken of are
unjust, the victory goes to him who speaks unjust things: for he
speaks of things that are just to speak of, though absolutely, i.e.
to suffer, they are unjust.
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26
    Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must,
according to the plan sketched above, be met by comparing together
the conclusion with its contradictory, and seeing that it shall
involve the same attribute in the same respect and relation and
manner and time. If this additional question be put at the start,
you should not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be
both double and not double, but grant that it is possible, only not
in such a way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your
case. All the following arguments depend upon a point of that kind.
‘Does a man who knows A to be A, know the thing called A?’ and in
the same way, ‘is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the
thing called A?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But one who knows that Coriscus is
Coriscus might be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, so that
he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing.’ Is a thing four
cubits long greater than a thing three cubits long?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But a
thing might grow from three to four cubits in length; ‘now what is
‘greater’ is greater than a ‘less’: accordingly the thing in
question will be both greater and less than itself in the same
respect.
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    div id="section27" class="section" title="27">
27
    As to refutations that depend on begging and assuming the
original point to be proved, suppose the nature of the question to
be obvious, one should not grant it, even though it be a view
generally held, but should tell him the truth. Suppose, however,
that it escapes one, then, thanks to the badness of arguments of
that kind, one should make one’s error recoil upon the questioner,
and say that he has brought no argument: for a refutation must be
proved independently of the original point. Secondly, one should
say that the point was granted under the impression that he
intended not to use it as a premiss, but to reason against it, in
the