The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

these. This would be evident, if we were to change the
order of such definitions, e.g. of that of man, saying ‘animal
which is two-footed and endowed with feet’; for ‘endowed with feet’
is superfluous when ‘two-footed’ has been said. But there is no
order in the substance; for how are we to think the one element
posterior and the other prior? Regarding the definitions, then,
which are reached by the method of divisions, let this suffice as
our first attempt at stating their nature.
<
    div id="section88" class="section" title="13">
13
    Let us return to the subject of our inquiry, which is substance.
As the substratum and the essence and the compound of these are
called substance, so also is the universal. About two of these we
have spoken; both about the essence and about the substratum, of
which we have said that it underlies in two senses, either being a
‘this’-which is the way in which an animal underlies its
attributes-or as the matter underlies the complete reality. The
universal also is thought by some to be in the fullest sense a
cause, and a principle; therefore let us attack the discussion of
this point also. For it seems impossible that any universal term
should be the name of a substance. For firstly the substance of
each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong
to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called
universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing. Of
which individual then will this be the substance? Either of all or
of none; but it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is to be
the substance of one, this one will be the others also; for things
whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also
one.
    Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a
subject, but the universal is predicable of some subject
always.
    But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the
way in which the essence is so, can be present in this; e.g.
‘animal’ can be present in ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Then clearly it is a
formula of the essence. And it makes no difference even if it is
not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for none the
less the universal will be the substance of something, as ‘man’ is
the substance of the individual man in whom it is present, so that
the same result will follow once more; for the universal, e.g.
‘animal’, will be the substance of that in which it is present as
something peculiar to it. And further it is impossible and absurd
that the ‘this’, i.e. the substance, if it consists of parts,
should not consist of substances nor of what is a ‘this’, but of
quality; for that which is not substance, i.e. the quality, will
then be prior to substance and to the ‘this’. Which is impossible;
for neither in formula nor in time nor in coming to be can the
modifications be prior to the substance; for then they will also be
separable from it. Further, Socrates will contain a substance
present in a substance, so that this will be the substance of two
things. And in general it follows, if man and such things are
substance, that none of the elements in their formulae is the
substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the species or
in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no ‘animal’ exists
apart from the particular kinds of animal, nor does any other of
the elements present in formulae exist apart.
    If, then, we view the matter from these standpoints, it is plain
that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also
from the fact that no common predicate indicates a ‘this’, but
rather a ‘such’. If not, many difficulties follow and especially
the ‘third man’.
    The conclusion is evident also from the following consideration.
A substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete
reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never
in complete reality one, though if they are potentially two, they
can be one (e.g. the double line consists of two
halves-potentially; for the complete realization of the halves
divides them from one another); therefore if the substance is one,
it will not consist of substances present in it and present in this
way, which Democritus describes rightly; he says one thing cannot
be made out of two nor two out of one; for he identifies substances
with his indivisible magnitudes. It is clear therefore that the
same will hold good of number, if number is a synthesis of