The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

what is chosen before other things.
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3
    Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible
subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some
things? We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a madman
would deliberate about, but what a sensible man would deliberate
about, a subject of deliberation. Now about eternal things no one
deliberates, e.g. about the material universe or the
incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. But no
more do we deliberate about the things that involve movement but
always happen in the same way, whether of necessity or by nature or
from any other cause, e.g. the solstices and the risings of the
stars; nor about things that happen now in one way, now in another,
e.g. droughts and rains; nor about chance events, like the finding
of treasure. But we do not deliberate even about all human affairs;
for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution
for the Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about by
our own efforts.
    We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be
done; and these are in fact what is left. For nature, necessity,
and chance are thought to be causes, and also reason and everything
that depends on man. Now every class of men deliberates about the
things that can be done by their own efforts. And in the case of
exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, e.g.
about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they
should be written); but the things that are brought about by our
own efforts, but not always in the same way, are the things about
which we deliberate, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of
money-making. And we do so more in the case of the art of
navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less
exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio,
and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences;
for we have more doubt about the former. Deliberation is concerned
with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in
which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is
indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on
important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to
deciding.
    We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does
not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he
shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and
order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. They assume
the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained;
and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by
which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved
by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by
what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first
cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who
deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described
as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all
investigation appears to be deliberation—for instance mathematical
investigations—but all deliberation is investigation), and what is
last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of
becoming. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the
search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a
thing appears possible we try to do it. By ‘possible’ things I mean
things that might be brought about by our own efforts; and these in
a sense include things that can be brought about by the efforts of
our friends, since the moving principle is in ourselves. The
subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments, sometimes
the use of them; and similarly in the other cases—sometimes the
means, sometimes the mode of using it or the means of bringing it
about. It seems, then, as has been said, that man is a moving
principle of actions; now deliberation is about the things to be
done by the agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things
other than themselves. For the end cannot be a subject of
deliberation, but only the means; nor indeed can the particular
facts be a subject of it, as whether this is bread or has been
baked as it should; for these are matters of perception. If we are
to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.
    The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that
the object of choice is already determinate,