The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

association of a
father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father
cares for his children; and this is why Homer calls Zeus ‘father’;
it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule. But among the
Persians the rule of the father is tyrannical; they use their sons
as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for
it is the advantage of the master that is brought about in it. Now
this seems to be a correct form of government, but the Persian type
is perverted; for the modes of rule appropriate to different
relations are diverse. The association of man and wife seems to be
aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and
in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that
befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man rules in everything
the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in doing so he is not
acting in accordance with their respective worth, and not ruling in
virtue of his superiority. Sometimes, however, women rule, because
they are heiresses; so their rule is not in virtue of excellence
but due to wealth and power, as in oligarchies. The association of
brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal, except in so far as
they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the
friendship is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found
chiefly in masterless dwellings (for here every one is on an
equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and every one
has licence to do as he pleases.
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    Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just
in so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and
his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he
confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for
them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his
sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the peoples’).
Such too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds the
other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is
responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the
greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
    These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by
nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over
descendants, a king over his subjects. These friendships imply
superiority of one party over the other, which is why ancestors are
honoured. The justice therefore that exists between persons so
related is not the same on both sides but is in every case
proportioned to merit; for that is true of the friendship as well.
The friendship of man and wife, again, is the same that is found in
an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets
more of what is good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too,
with the justice in these relations. The friendship of brothers is
like that of comrades; for they are equal and of like age, and such
persons are for the most part like in their feelings and their
character. Like this, too, is the friendship appropriate to
timocratic government; for in such a constitution the ideal is for
the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in turn,
and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will
correspond.
    But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too
does friendship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny
there is little or no friendship. For where there is nothing common
to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is
not justice; e.g. between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master
and slave; the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses
it, but there is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things.
But neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a
slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the two parties;
the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. Qua slave
then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can; for
there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who
can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement;
therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is
a man. Therefore while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly
exist, in democracies they exist more fully; for where the citizens
are equal they have much in common.
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    Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has
been said. One might,