The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

correctly
rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has
been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus
(e.g.) seeing that ‘the knowledge of this’ signifies many things
for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of
its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4)
the use of knowledge about it-no property of the ‘knowledge of
this’ could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as
to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. For
constructive purposes, a man should see if the term of which he is
rendering the property avoids bearing many senses and is one and
simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in
this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘man’ is used in a single
sense, ‘naturally civilized animal’ would be correctly stated as a
property of man.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has
been repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected
in rendering ‘properties’ also, just as they do in their
‘definitions’ as well: but a property to which this has happened
will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it
confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure,
and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition of the
same term is likely to happen in two ways; one is, when a man
repeatedly uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to
render, as a property of fire, ‘the body which is the most rarefied
of bodies’ (for he has repeated the word ‘body’); the second is, if
a man replaces words by their definitions, as would happen if any
one were to render, as a property of earth, ‘the substance which is
by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space’,
and were then to substitute ‘substances of such and such a kind’
for the word ‘bodies’: for ‘body’ and ‘a substance of such and such
a kind’ mean one and the same thing. For he will have repeated the
word ‘substance’, and accordingly neither of the properties would
be correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see whether he avoids ever repeating the same term; for then the
property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus
(e.g.) seeing that he who has stated ‘animal capable of acquiring
knowledge’ as a property of man has avoided repeating the same term
several times, the property would in this respect have been
correctly rendered of man.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in
the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one
which does not distinguish its subject from other things is
useless, and it is the business of the language Of ‘properties’, as
also of the language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case
contemplated, therefore, the property will not have been correctly
rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of
knowledge to be a ‘conception incontrovertible by argument, because
of its unity’, has used in the property a term of that kind, viz.
‘unity’, which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property
of knowledge could not have been correctly stated. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms
that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes
the subject from something: for then the property will in this
respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who
has said that it is a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a
soul’ has used no term that is common to everything, it would in
this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a
‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’.
    Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than
one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he
is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been
correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there
should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the
essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be
rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property
mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.)
a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be ‘the most
rarefied and lightest body’ has rendered more than one property
(for each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it