The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

of virtue would
in this respect have been correctly rendered.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the
property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite
proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is
rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly
stated. For in the first place, any unusual procedure always needs
a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to
render as property some attribute that always follows. In the
second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was
the property of the present time which he intended to state, is
obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse
criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as the property of a
particular man ‘to be sitting with a particular man’, states the
property of the present time, and so he cannot have rendered the
property correctly, seeing that he has described it without any
definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
whether, in rendering the property of the present time, he has, in
stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the
present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this
respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said
that it is the property of a particular man ‘to be walking now’,
has made this distinction in his statement, and so the property
would have been correctly stated.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a
property of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by
sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly
stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the
sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether
it still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This
principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not
always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has stated
that it is a property of the sun to be ‘the brightest star that
moves over the earth’, has used in describing the property an
expression of that kind, viz. ‘to move over the earth’, which is
evidenced by sensation; and so the sun’s property could not have
been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun
sets, whether it continues to move over the earth, because
sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see whether he has rendered the property of a kind that is
not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly
belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect
have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that
it is a property of a surface to be ‘the primary thing that is
coloured’, has introduced amongst the rest a sensible quality, ‘to
be coloured’, but still a quality such as manifestly always
belongs, and so the property of ‘surface’ would in this respect
have been correctly rendered.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the
definition as a property: for then the property will not have been
correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its
essence. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of
man to be ‘a walking, biped animal’ has rendered a property of man
so as to signify his essence, and so the property of man could not
have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see whether the property which he has rendered forms a
predicate convertible with its subject, without, however,
signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect
have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it
is a property of man to be a ‘naturally civilized animal’ has
rendered the property so as to be convertible with its subject,
without, however, showing its essence, and so the property of man’
would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the
property without having placed the subject within its essence. For
of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be
rendered should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be
appended immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject
from other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way
could not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has
said that it is a property of a living creature to ‘have