The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

a soul’
has not placed ‘living creature’ within its essence, and so the
property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man
first places within its essence the subject whose property he is
rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in
this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has
stated that is a property of man to be an ‘animal capable of
receiving knowledge’, has rendered the property after placing the
subject within its essence, and so the property of ‘man’ would in
this respect have been correctly rendered.
<
    div id="section45" class="section" title="4">
4
    The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly
rendered or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the
other hand, whether what is stated is or is not a property at all,
you should examine from the following points of view. For the
commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that the property
is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a
property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course
of them.
    Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each
subject of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it
fails to belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in
that particular respect, or to be a property of each of them in
respect of that character of which he has rendered the property:
for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property.
Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician
that he ‘cannot be deceived by an argument’ (for a geometrician is
deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property
of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property
rendered be true of every instance, and true in that particular
respect: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a
property. Thus, for example, in as much as the description ‘an
animal capable of receiving knowledge’ is true of every man, and
true of him qua man, it would be a property of man to be ‘an animal
capable of receiving knowledge’. commonplace rule means-for
destructive purposes, see if the description fails to be true of
that of which the name is true; and if the name fails to be true of
that of which the description is true: for constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if the description too is predicated of that
of which the name is predicated, and if the name too is predicated
of that of which the description is predicated.]
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to
apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to
apply to that to which the description applies: for then what is
stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as the description ‘a living being that partakes of
knowledge’ is true of God, while ‘man’ is not predicated of God, to
be a living being that partakes of knowledge’ could not be a
property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description
is predicated, and if the description as well be predicated of that
of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be
a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate ‘living
creature’ is true of that of which ‘having a soul’ is true, and
‘having a soul’ is true of that of which the predicate ‘living
creature’ is true; and so ‘having a soul would be a property of
‘living creature’.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject
as a property of that which is described as ‘in the subject’: for
then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered ‘fire’ as the property
of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’, has rendered the
subject as the property of its predicate, ‘fire’ could not be a
property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’. The reason
why the subject will not be a property of that which is found in
the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property
of a number of things that are specifically different. For the same
thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that
belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of