The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

could
not be a correctly stated property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied
and lightest body’. On the other hand, for constructive purposes,
see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the
same thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will
in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who
has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a ‘body adaptable
to every shape’ has rendered as its property a single character and
not several, and so the property of ‘liquid’ would in this respect
have been correctly stated.
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3
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed
either the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of
its species: for then the property will not have been correctly
stated. For the object of rendering the property is that people may
understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it
was to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it,
and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to
understand anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.)
any one who has said that it is property of ‘animal’ to be ‘the
substance to which “man” belongs as a species’ has employed one of
its species, and therefore the property could not have been
correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of
its species: for then the property will in this respect have been
correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a
property of a living creature to be ‘compounded of soul and body’
has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject itself or
any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property of a
‘living creature’ would have been correctly rendered.
    You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other
terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus,
for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything
either opposite to the subject or, in general, anything
simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to it: for then the
property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is
simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous
by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more
intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a
property of good to be ‘the most direct opposite of evil’, has
employed the opposite of good, and so the property of good could
not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either
opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the
subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this
respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has
stated that it is a property of knowledge to be ‘the most
convincing conception’ has avoided employing anything either
opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to, the
subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect
have been correctly stated.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as
property something that does not always follow the subject but
sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not
have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either
that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which
we find such an attribute belonging; nor yet that the name of the
subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is
found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he
has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs,
seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the
property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that
it is a property of animal ‘sometimes to move and sometimes to
stand still’ rendered the kind of property which sometimes is not a
property, and so the property could not have been correctly stated.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has
rendered something that of necessity must always be a property: for
then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated.
Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to
be ‘what makes its possessor good’ has rendered as property
something that always follows, and so the property