The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

all of
these, if any one states the property in this way. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found
in the subject as a property of the subject: for then what has been
stated not to be a property will be a property, if it be predicated
only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property.
Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of ‘earth’ to be
‘specifically the heaviest body’ has rendered of the subject as its
property something that is said of the thing in question alone, and
is said of it in the manner in which a property is predicated, and
so the property of earth would have been rightly stated.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the
property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property
will not be a property. For an attribute of which the subject
partakes is a constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of
that kind would be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g.
inasmuch as he who has said that ‘walking on two feet’ is property
of man has rendered the property as partaken of, ‘walking on two
feet’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property as
partaken of, or as showing the essence, though the subject is
predicated convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to be a
property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that to
be ‘naturally sentient’ is a property of ‘animal’ has rendered the
property neither as partaken of nor as showing the essence, though
the subject is predicated convertibly with it; and so to be
‘naturally sentient’ would be a property of ‘animal’.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot
possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior
or as prior to the attribute described in the name: for then what
is stated to be a property will not be a property either never, or
not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the
attribute ‘walking through the market-place’ to belong to an object
as prior and as posterior to the attribute ‘man’, ‘walking through
the market-place’ could not be a property of ‘man’ either never, or
not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if it
always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being
either a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not
to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute ‘an
animal capable of receiving knowledge’ always and of necessity
belongs simultaneously with the attribute ‘man’, and is neither
differentia nor definition of its subject, and so ‘an animal
capable of receiving knowledge’ would be a property of ‘man’.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to
be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as
they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will
not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property
of a ‘proper object of pursuit’ to ‘appear good to certain
persons’, it could not be a property of the ‘desirable’ either to
‘appear good to certain persons’: for ‘proper object of pursuit’
and ‘desirable’ mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that
is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then
is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as it is called a property of a man, in so far as he is a
man, ‘to have a tripartite soul’, it would also be a property of a
mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul.
This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for
the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the
same things, in so far as they are the same.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things
that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the
same in kind as the alleged property: for then neither will what is
stated to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not
always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it
could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for
to stand and to move by his own initiative are the same in kind,
because they belong to each of them in so far as