The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

coloured’ as the property of
‘surface’, ‘coloured’ will be true of body as well; whereas if he
render it of ‘body’, it will be predicated also of ‘surface’. Hence
the name as well will not be true of that of which the description
is true.
    In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error
is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what
things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to
render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it
either naturally, as ‘biped’ belongs to ‘man’, or actually, as
‘having four fingers’ belongs to a particular man, or specifically,
as ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ belongs to ‘fire’, or
absolutely, as ‘life’ to ‘living being’, or one that belongs to a
thing only as called after something else, as ‘wisdom’ to the
‘soul’, or on the other hand primarily, as ‘wisdom’ to the
‘rational faculty’, or because the thing is in a certain state, as
‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to a ‘scientist’ (for simply
and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be
‘incontrovertible by argument’), or because it is the state
possessed by something, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs
to ‘science’, or because it is partaken of, as ‘sensation’ belongs
to ‘animal’ (for other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but
they have it because they already partake of ‘animal’), or because
it partakes of something else, as ‘life’ belongs to a particular
kind of ‘living being’. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has
failed to add the word ‘naturally’, because what belongs naturally
may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as
(e.g.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he
does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually
belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what it now is,
e.g. the man’s possession of four fingers. So he errs if he has not
shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that
he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will
not be true of that of which the description is true, as is the
case with ‘coloured’, whether rendered as a property of ‘surface’
or of ‘body’. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has
rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses
a state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because
then it will not be a property. For, supposing he renders the
property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to
what possesses that state; while supposing he renders it to what
possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did
‘incontrovertible by argument’ when stated as a property of
‘science’ or of the ‘scientist’. So he errs if he has not indicated
beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of,
or is partaken of by, something; because then the property will
belong to certain other things as well. For if he renders it
because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things
which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject
partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken
of, as (e.g.) if he were to state ‘life’ to be a property of a
‘particular kind of living being’, or just of ‘living being. So he
errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that
belongs specifically, because then it will belong only to one of
the things that fall under the term of which he states the
property: for the superlative belongs only to one of them, e.g.
‘lightest’ as applied to ‘fire’. Sometimes, too, a man may even add
the word ‘specifically’, and still make a mistake. For the things
in question should all be of one species, whenever the word
‘specifically’ is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as
it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not all of
one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them
‘fire’, but are of different species. The reason why, whenever
‘specifically’ is added, there should not be any species other than
the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in
question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in
a less degree, as happens with ‘consisting of most rarefied
particles’ in the case of fire: for ‘light’