The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

negative
subject, the positive will be a property of the positive as well.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not
to live’, it would be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’: also
if it seems to be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’, it will
also seem to be a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’.
    Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by
themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property
rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same
term will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also,
if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will
not be a property of the positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’, ‘animate’ could not
be a property of ‘not-living creature’. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property of
the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative.
This commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term
is not a property of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a
positive term does not belong at all to a negative, while a
negative term, though it belongs to a positive, does not belong as
a property.
    Next, look from the point of view of the coordinate members of a
division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the
co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a
property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members
(parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated
be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible living being’ is not a property of any
of the other living beings, ‘intelligible living being’ could not
be a property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members
(parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of
these co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then the
remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been
stated not to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a
property of ‘wisdom’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the
rational faculty’, then, taking each of the other virtues as well
in this way, it would be a property of ‘temperance’ to be
essentially ‘the natural virtue of the faculty of desire’.
    Next, look from the point of view of the inflexions, and see,
for destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered
fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then
neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other
inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘beautifully’ is not a property
of ‘justly’, neither could ‘beautiful’ be a property of ‘just’. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of
the property rendered is a property of the inflexion of the
subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of
the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘walking biped’ is a
property of man, it would also be any one’s property ‘as a man’ to
be described ‘as a walking biped’. Not only in the case of the
actual term mentioned should one look at the inflexions, but also
in the case of its opposites, just as has been laid down in the
case of the former commonplace rules as well.’ Thus, for
destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the
property rendered fails to be the property of the inflexion of the
opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the
other opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other
opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘well’ is not a property of
‘justly’, neither could ‘badly’ be a property of ‘unjustly’. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of
the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of
the inflexion of the opposite of the original subject: for then
also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the
inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘best’ is
a property of ‘the good’, ‘worst’ also will be a property of ‘the
evil’.
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7
    Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like
relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a
relation like