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The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

Titel: The Complete Aristotle (eng.) Kostenlos Bücher Online Lesen
Autoren: Aristotle
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‘injustice’. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the
contrary: for then also the contrary of the first will be the
property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
evil is contrary to good, and objectionable to desirable, and
‘desirable’ is a property of ‘good’, ‘objectionable’ would be a
property of ‘evil’.
    Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites
and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the term
rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject:
for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of
the correlative of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘double’ is
relative to ‘half’, and ‘in excess’ to ‘exceeded’, while ‘in
excess’ is not a property of ‘double’, exceeded’ could not be a
property of ‘half’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the
subject’s correlative: for then also the correlative of the first
will be a property of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch
as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and the proportion 1:2 is
relative to the proportion 2:1, while it is a property of ‘double’
to be ‘in the proportion of 2 to 1’, it would be a property of
‘half’ to be ‘in the proportion of 1 to 2’.
    Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute
described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the
given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in
terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of
Y). Also if, on the other hand, an attribute described in terms of
the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of
Y), neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X)
be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it
is not predicated as a property of ‘deafness’ to be a ‘lack of
sensation’, neither could it be a property of ‘hearing’ to be a
‘sensation’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if
an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the
given state (Y): for then also the attribute that is described in
terms of the privation (of X) will be a property of the privation
(of Y). Also, if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of
X) be a property of the privation (of Y), then also the attribute
that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of
the state (Y). Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to see’ is a property of
‘sight’, inasmuch as we have sight, ‘failure to see’ would be a
property of ‘blindness’, inasmuch as we have not got the sight we
should naturally have.
    Next, look from the point of view of positive and negative
terms; and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken
by themselves. This common-place rule is useful only for a
destructive purpose. Thus (e.g.) see if the positive term or the
attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject:
for then the negative term or the attribute described in terms of
it will not be a property of the subject. Also if, on the other
hand, the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it
is a property of the subject, then the positive term or the
attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the
subject: e.g. inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living
creature’, ‘inanimate’ could not be a property of ‘living
creature’.
    Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates,
positive or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for
destructive purposes, if the positive term falls to be a property
of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be
a property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term
fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the
positive term be a property of the positive subject. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as ‘animal’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could
‘not-animal’ be a property of ‘not-man’. Also if ‘not-animal’ seems
not to be a property of ‘not-man’, neither will ‘animal’ be a
property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for
then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject
as well. Also if the negative term be a property of the

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