The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

consists of more
rarefied particles than live coals and flame. And this should not
happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of
that of which the description is truer; otherwise the rule that
where the description is truer the name too should be truer is not
fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute will
be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of
that element therein which has it in the highest degree, as is the
condition of the property ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’
in the case of ‘fire’: for this same attribute will be the property
of ‘light’ as well: for it is ‘light’ that ‘consists of the most
rarefied particles’. If, then, any one else renders a property in
this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give
occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one
states the property at the actual time of making the statement.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as
a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a
property will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows
its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a
definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘becoming’ is a
property of ‘beautiful’ has rendered the term as a property of
itself (for ‘beautiful’ and ‘becoming’ are the same); and so
‘becoming’ could not be a property of ‘beautiful’. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a
thing as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible
predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a
property. Thus he who has stated ‘animate substance’ as a property
of ‘living-creature’ has not stated ‘living-creature’ as a property
of itself, but has rendered a convertible predicate, so that
‘animate substance’ would be a property of ‘living-creature’.
    Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should
look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the
whole be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not
predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the
property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this
is so: for sometimes in rendering a property in the case of things
that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole,
while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the
part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered.
Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that
it is a property of the ‘sea’ to be ‘the largest volume of salt
water’, has stated the property of something that consists of like
parts, but has rendered an attribute of such a kind as is not true
of the part (for a particular sea is not ‘the largest volume of
salt water’); and so the largest volume of salt water’ could not be
a property of the ‘sea’. Now take one referring to the part: the
man who has stated that it is a property of ‘air’ to be
‘breathable’ has stated the property of something that consists of
like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of
some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of
the air is not breathable); and so ‘breathable’ could not be a
property of ‘air’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar
parts, it is on the other hand a property of them taken as a
collective whole: for then what has been stated not to be a
property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth
everywhere that it naturally falls downwards, it is a property of
the various particular pieces of earth taken as ‘the Earth’, so
that it would be a property of ‘earth’ ‘naturally to fall
downwards’.
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6
    Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites,
and first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive
purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a
property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the
contrary of the first be a property of the contrary of the second.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice, and the
lowest evil to the highest good, but ‘to be the highest good’ is
not a property of ‘justice’, therefore ‘to be the lowest evil’
could not be a property of