The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

that of the property rendered fails to be a property
of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither
will what is in a relation like that of the first be a property of
what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch
as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is
like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is
not a property of a doctor to produce health, it could not be a
property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that
of the property rendered is a property of what is in a relation
like that of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like
that of the first will be a property of what is in a relation like
that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of a
doctor towards the possession of ability to produce health is like
that of a trainer towards the possession of ability to produce
vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to
produce vigour, it would be a property of a doctor to possess the
ability to produce health.
    Next look from the point of view of things that are identically
related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that
is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property
of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in
question; for then neither will the predicate that is identically
related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is
identically related to it as the first. If, on the other hand, the
predicate which is identically related to two subjects is the
property of the subject which is identically related to it as the
subject in question, then it will not be a property of that of
which it has been stated to be a property. (e.g.) inasmuch as
prudence is identically related to both the noble and the base,
since it is knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of
prudence to be knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property
of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If, on the other hand, it
is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble, it
could not be a property of it to be the knowledge of the base.] For
it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than
one subject. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this
commonplace rule is of no use: for what is ‘identically related’ is
a single predicate in process of comparison with more than one
subject.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified
by the verb ‘to be’ fails to be a property of the subject qualified
by the verb ‘to be’: for then neither will the destruction of the
one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to be
destroyed’, nor will the ‘becoming’the one be a property of the
other qualified by the verb ‘to become’. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it
is not a property of ‘man’ to be an animal, neither could it be a
property of becoming a man to become an animal; nor could the
destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man.
In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ to
‘being’ and ‘being destroyed’, and from ‘being destroyed’ to
‘being’ and to ‘becoming’ exactly as they have just been given from
‘being’ to ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if the subject set down as
qualified by the verb ‘to be’ has the predicate set down as so
qualified, as its property: for then also the subject qualified by
the very ‘to become’ will have the predicate qualified by ‘to
become’ as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb to
be destroyed’ will have as its property the predicate rendered with
this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is a property
of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to
become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a
property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should
derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’ both to
‘being’ and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as
was directed also for the purpose of destruction.
    Next take a look at the ‘idea’ of the subject stated, and see,
for destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong
to the ‘idea’ in question, or fails to belong to it in virtue of
that character