The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

rule
is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a
property of more than one thing.
    Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more
likely to be a property of a given subject fails to be its
property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a
property of it be its property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible’
is more likely than ‘divisible’ to be a property of ‘animal’, and
‘sensible’ is not a property of animal, ‘divisible’ could not be a
property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property;
for then what is more likely to be a property of it will be a
property as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as ‘sensation’ is
less likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than life’, and
‘sensation’ is a property of animal, ‘life’ would be a property of
animal.
    Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong
in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if
what is as much a property fails to be a property of that of which
it is as much a property: for then neither will that which is as
much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much
a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘desiring’ is as much a
property of the faculty of desire as reasoning’ is a property of
the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property of the
faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty
of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if
what is as much a property is a property of that of which it is as
much a property: for then also what is as much a property as it
will be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as it is as much a property of ‘the faculty of
reason’ to be ‘the primary seat of wisdom’ as it is of ‘the faculty
of desire’ to be ‘the primary seat of temperance’, and it is a
property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of wisdom,
it would be a property of the faculty of desire to be the primary
seat of temperance.
    Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a
property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither
will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as ‘seeing’ is as much a property of man as ‘hearing’, and
‘seeing’ is not a property of man, ‘hearing’ could not be a
property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if what is as much a property of it is its property: for then what
is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as
well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the
primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part that reasons,
and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a
part that desires, and so it be a property of the soul to be the
primary possessor of a part that reasons.
    Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a
property of that of which it is as much a property: for then
neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a
property as of the former, while if it be a property of the former,
it will not be a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to
burn’ is as much a property of ‘flame’ as of ‘live coals’, and ‘to
burn’ is not a property of flame, ‘to burn’ could not be a property
of live coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be
a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, this commonplace rule is of no use.
    The rule based on things that are in a like relation’ differs
from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,’
because the former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection
on the belonging of any attribute, while the latter is judged by a
comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs.
    Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property
potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the
property relatively to something that does not exist, when the
potentiality in question cannot belong to what does not exist: for
then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus
(e.g.) he who has said that ‘breathable’ is a property of ‘air’
has, on the one hand, rendered the property potentially (for that
is ‘breathable’ which is such as can be breathed), and on the other
hand has also