The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

which causes it to bear the description of which the
property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a
property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘being
motionless’ does not belong to ‘man-himself’ qua ‘man’, but qua
‘idea’, it could not be a property of ‘man’ to be motionless. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in
question belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in
virtue of which there is predicated of it that character of which
the predicate in question has been stated not to be a property: for
then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belongs to ‘living-creature-itself’ to
be compounded of soul and body, and further this belongs to it qua
‘living-creature’, it would be a property of ‘living-creature’ to
be compounded of soul and body.
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8
    Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees,
and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is more-P fails
to be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is
less-P be a property of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor
most-P of most-S, nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a
body, neither could being less highly coloured be a property of
what is less a body, nor being coloured be a property of body at
all. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is
more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what is
less-P will be a property of what is less S, and least-P of
least-S, and most-P of most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a
higher degree of life, a lower degree of sensation also would be a
property of a lower degree of life, and the highest of the highest
and the lowest of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of life
simply.
    Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication
to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for
destructive purposes, if P simply fails to be a property of S
simply; for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor
less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘virtuous’ is not a property of ‘man’,
neither could ‘more virtuous’ be a property of what is ‘more
human’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P
simply is a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a
property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S,
and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by
nature is a property of fire, and so also a greater tendency to
move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery.
In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the
point of view of the others as well.
    Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if the more likely
property fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for
then neither will the less likely property be a property of the
less likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘perceiving’ is more
likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than ‘knowing’ of ‘man’, and
‘perceiving’ is not a property of ‘animal’, ‘knowing’ could not be
a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if the less likely property is a property of the less likely
subject; for then too the more likely property will be a property
of the more likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to be
naturally civilized’ is less likely to be a property of man than
‘to live’ of an animal, and it is a property of man to be naturally
civilized, it would be a property of animal to live.
    Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails
to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a
property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which
it is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of
the former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as ‘to be coloured’ is more likely to be a property of a
‘surface’ than of a ‘body’, and it is not a property of a surface,
‘to be coloured’ could not be a property of ‘body’; while if it is
a property of a ‘surface’, it could not be a property of a ‘body’.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace