The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

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10
    Again, look at things which are like the subject in question,
and see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge
has more than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to
possess sight be to see, then also to possess hearing will be to
hear. Likewise also in the case of other things, both those which
are and those which are generally held to be like. The rule in
question is useful for both purposes; for if it be as stated in the
case of some one like thing, it is so with the other like things as
well, whereas if it be not so in the case of some one of them,
neither is it so in the case of the others. Look and see also
whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number
of things: for sometimes there is a discrepancy. Thus, if to ‘know’
a thing be to ‘think of’ it, then also to ‘know many things’ is to
‘be thinking of many things’; whereas this is not true; for it is
possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them. If,
then, the latter proposition be not true, neither was the former
that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to ‘know’ a thing is to
‘think of’ it.
    Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to
greater degrees there are four commonplace rules. One is: See
whether a greater degree of the predicate follows a greater degree
of the subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also a
greater pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil,
see whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. Now this
rule is of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the
accident follows an increase of the subject, as we have said,
clearly the accident belongs; while if it does not follow, the
accident does not belong. You should establish this by induction.
Another rule is: If one predicate be attributed to two subjects;
then supposing it does not belong to the subject to which it is the
more likely to belong, neither does it belong where it is less
likely to belong; while if it does belong where it is less likely
to belong, then it belongs as well where it is more likely. Again:
If two predicates be attributed to one subject, then if the one
which is more generally thought to belong does not belong, neither
does the one that is less generally thought to belong; or, if the
one that is less generally thought to belong does belong, so also
does the other. Moreover: If two predicates be attributed to two
subjects, then if the one which is more usually thought to belong
to the one subject does not belong, neither does the remaining
predicate belong to the remaining subject; or, if the one which is
less usually thought to belong to the one subject does belong, so
too does the remaining predicate to the remaining subject.
    Moreover, you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs,
or is generally supposed to belong, in a like degree, in three
ways, viz. those described in the last three rules given in regard
to a greater degree.’ For supposing that one predicate belongs, or
is supposed to belong, to two subjects in a like degree, then if it
does not belong to the one, neither does it belong to the other;
while if it belongs to the one, it belongs to the remaining one as
well. Or, supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree to
the same subject, then, if the one does not belong, neither does
the remaining one; while if the one does belong, the remaining one
belongs as well. The case is the same also if two predicates belong
in a like degree to two subjects; for if the one predicate does not
belong to the one subject, neither does the remaining predicate
belong to the remaining subject, while if the one predicate does
belong to the one subject, the remaining predicate belongs to the
remaining subject as well.
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    div id="section29" class="section" title="11">
11
    You can argue, then, from greater or less or like degrees of
truth in the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover, you should argue
from the addition of one thing to another. If the addition of one
thing to another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly
it was not white or good, then the thing added will be white or
good-it will possess the character it imparts to the whole as well.
Moreover, if an addition of something to a given object intensifies
the character which it had as given, then the thing added will
itself as well be of that character. Likewise, also, in the case of
other attributes. The rule is not