The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

applicable in all cases, but only
in those in which the excess described as an ‘increased intensity’
is found to take place. The above rule is, however, not convertible
for overthrowing a view. For if the thing added does not make the
other good, it is not thereby made clear whether in itself it may
not be good: for the addition of good to evil does not necessarily
make the whole good, any more than the addition of white to black
makes the whole white.
    Again, any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less
degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of
good or of white will not be attributed to what is not good or
white: for a bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less
degree of goodness than another, but always of badness. This rule
is not convertible, either, for the purpose of overthrowing a
predication: for several predicates of which we cannot speak of a
greater degree belong absolutely: for the term ‘man’ is not
attributed in greater and less degrees, but a man is a man for all
that.
    You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a
given respect, and at a given time and place: for if the predicate
be possible in some respect, it is possible also absolutely.
Likewise, also, is what is predicated at a given time or place: for
what is absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect
or at any place or time. An objection may be raised that in a given
respect people may be good by nature, e.g. they may be generous or
temperately inclined, while absolutely they are not good by nature,
because no one is prudent by nature. Likewise, also, it is possible
for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time,
whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. In the same
way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and
such a diet, e.g. in infected areas, though it is not a good thing
absolutely. Moreover, in certain places it is possible to live
singly and alone, but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly
and alone. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable
to sacrifice one’s father, e.g. among the Triballi, whereas,
absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this may indicate a
relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same
wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable
among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi.
Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g.
when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely. Or possibly this
again may indicate a relativity not to a certain time, but to a
certain state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs,
if only one be in that state. A thing is ‘absolutely’ so which
without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the
contrary. Thus (e.g.) you will deny that to sacrifice one’s father
is honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not
therefore honourable absolutely. On the other hand, to honour the
gods you will declare to be honourable without adding anything,
because that is honourable absolutely. So that whatever without any
addition is generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable
or anything else of that kind, will be said to be so
‘absolutely’.

Topics, Book III
    Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
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    div id="book3" class="book" title="Book III">
    1
    The question which is the more desirable, or the better, of two
or more things, should be examined upon the following lines: only
first of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are
making concerns not things that are widely divergent and that
exhibit great differences from one another (for nobody raises any
doubt whether happiness or wealth is more desirable), but things
that are nearly related and about which we commonly discuss for
which of the two we ought rather to vote, because we do not see any
advantage on either side as compared with the other. Clearly, in
such cases if we can show a single advantage, or more than one, our
judgement will record our assent that whichever side happens to
have the advantage is the more desirable.
    First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more
desirable than that which is less so: and so is that which is more
likely to be chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the
right law, or by men who are good in any particular line, when they
make their choice as such, or by the experts in regard to any
particular