The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

than that of health over what produces health,
then what produces happiness is better than health. For what
produces happiness exceeds what produces health just as much as
happiness exceeds health. But health exceeds what produces health
by a smaller amount; ergo, the excess of what produces happiness
over what produces health is greater than that of health over what
produces health. Clearly, therefore, what produces happiness is
more desirable than health: for it exceeds the same standard by a
greater amount. Moreover, what is in itself nobler and more
precious and praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so,
e.g. friendship than wealth, and justice than strength. For the
former belong in themselves to the class of things precious and
praiseworthy, while the latter do so not in themselves but for
something else: for no one prizes wealth for itself but always for
something else, whereas we prize friendship for itself, even though
nothing else is likely to come to us from it.
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2
    Moreover, whenever two things are very much like one another,
and we cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of
them, we should look at them from the standpoint of their
consequences. For the one which is followed by the greater good is
the more desirable: or, if the consequences be evil, that is more
desirable which is followed by the less evil. For though both may
be desirable, yet there may possibly be some unpleasant consequence
involved to turn the scale. Our survey from the point of view of
consequences lies in two directions, for there are prior
consequences and later consequences: e.g. if a man learns, it
follows that he was ignorant before and knows afterwards. As a
rule, the later consequence is the better to consider. You should
take, therefore, whichever of the consequences suits your
purpose.
    Moreover, a greater number of good things is more desirable than
a smaller, either absolutely or when the one is included in the
other, viz. the smaller number in the greater. An objection may be
raised suppose in some particular case the one is valued for the
sake of the other; for then the two together are not more desirable
than the one; e.g. recovery of health and health, than health
alone, inasmuch as we desire recovery of health for the sake of
health. Also it is quite possible for what is not good, together
with what is, to be more desirable than a greater number of good
things, e.g. the combination of happiness and something else which
is not good may be more desirable than the combination of justice
and courage. Also, the same things are more valuable if accompanied
than if unaccompanied by pleasure, and likewise when free from pain
than when attended with pain.
    Also, everything is more desirable at the season when it is of
greater consequence; e.g. freedom from pain in old age more than in
youth: for it is of greater consequence in old age. On the same
principle also, prudence is more desirable in old age; for no man
chooses the young to guide him, because he does not expect them to
be prudent. With courage, the converse is the case, for it is in
youth that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively
required. Likewise also with temperance; for the young are more
troubled by their passions than are their elders.
    Also, that is more desirable which is more useful at every
season or at most seasons, e.g. justice and temperance rather than
courage: for they are always useful, while courage is only useful
at times. Also, that one of two things which if all possess, we do
not need the other thing, is more desirable than that which all may
possess and still we want the other one as well. Take the case of
justice and courage; if everybody were just, there would be no use
for courage, whereas all might be courageous, and still justice
would be of use.
    Moreover, judge by the destructions and losses and generations
and acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose
destruction is more objectionable are themselves more desirable.
Likewise also with the losses and contraries of things; for a thing
whose loss or whose contrary is more objectionable is itself more
desirable. With the generations or acquisitions of things the
opposite is the case: for things whose acquisition or generation is
more desirable are themselves also desirable. Another commonplace
rule is that what is nearer to the good is better and more
desirable, i.e. what more nearly resembles