The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

class of things; i.e. either whatever most of them or
what all of them would choose; e.g. in medicine or in carpentry
those things are more desirable which most, or all, doctors would
choose; or, in general, whatever most men or all men or all things
would choose, e.g. the good: for everything aims at the good. You
should direct the argument you intend to employ to whatever purpose
you require. Of what is ‘better’ or ‘more desirable’ the absolute
standard is the verdict of the better science, though relatively to
a given individual the standard may be his own particular
science.
    In the second place, that which is known as ‘an x’ is more
desirable than that which does not come within the genus ‘x’-e.g.
justice than a just man; for the former falls within the genus
‘good’, whereas the other does not, and the former is called ‘a
good’, whereas the latter is not: for nothing which does not happen
to belong to the genus in question is called by the generic name;
e.g. a ‘white man’ is not ‘a colour’. Likewise also in other
cases.
    Also, that which is desired for itself is more desirable than
that which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more
desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself,
the latter for something else. Also, that which is desirable in
itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens; e.g.
justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: for the former
is desirable in itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that
our enemies should be just per accidens, in order that they may do
us no harm. This last principle is the same as the one that
precedes it, with, however, a different turn of expression. For we
desire justice in our friends for itself, even though it will make
no difference to us, and even though they be in India; whereas in
our enemies we desire it for something else, in order that they may
do us no harm.
    Also, that which is in itself the cause of good is more
desirable than what is so per accidens, e.g. virtue than luck (for
the former in itself, and the latter per accidens, the cause of
good things), and so in other cases of the same kind. Likewise also
in the case of the contrary; for what is in itself the cause of
evil is more objectionable than what is so per accidens, e.g. vice
and chance: for the one is bad in itself, whereas chance is so per
accidens.
    Also, what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is
good for a particular person, e.g. recovery of health than a
surgical operation; for the former is good absolutely, the latter
only for a particular person, viz. the man who needs an operation.
So too what is good by nature is more desirable than the good that
is not so by nature, e.g. justice than the just man; for the one is
good by nature, whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired.
Also the attribute is more desirable which belongs to the better
and more honourable subject, e.g. to a god rather than to a man,
and to the soul rather than to the body. So too the property of the
better thing is better than the property of the worse; e.g. the
property of God than the property of man: for whereas in respect of
what is common in both of them they do not differ at all from each
other, in respect of their properties the one surpasses the other.
Also that is better which is inherent in things better or prior or
more honourable: thus (e.g.) health is better than strength and
beauty: for the former is inherent in the moist and the dry, and
the hot and the cold, in fact in all the primary constituents of an
animal, whereas the others are inherent in what is secondary,
strength being a feature of the sinews and bones, while beauty is
generally supposed to consist in a certain symmetry of the limbs.
Also the end is generally supposed to be more desirable than the
means, and of two means, that which lies nearer the end. In
general, too, a means directed towards the end of life is more
desirable than a means to anything else, e.g. that which
contributes to happiness than that which contributes to prudence.
Also the competent is more desirable than the incompetent.
Moreover, of two productive agents that one is more desirable whose
end is better; while between a productive agent and an end we can
decide by a proportional sum whenever the excess of the one end
over the other is greater than that of the latter over its own
productive means: e.g. supposing the excess of happiness over
health to be greater